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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 15-2639
_____________

VINCENT TIRPAK,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF DELWARE DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION;
JAMES H. SILLS, III, individually; MICHAEL J. MYRON, individually;
LI WEN LIN, individually; MATTHEW PAYNE, individually; and
KIM THORNTON, individually

_____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware
(District Court No.: 1-13-cv-00346)
District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
_____________________________________

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on April 8, 2016
(Filed: May 3, 2016)

Before: FISHER, COWEN and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

____________

O P I N I O N*
____________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
Vincent Tirpak, a former employee of the Delaware Department of Technology
and Information (“DTI”), appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to DTI
and the following DTI employees: James H. Sills, III, Michael J. Myron, Li Wen Lin,
Matthew Payne, and Kim Thornton (“DTI employee-defendants”). Tirpak claimed that
these defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Family
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). We will affirm the District Court’s ruling.1
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts of this
case, we set forth only a brief summary here. Tirpak, who suffers from attention deficit
disorder and depression, started working for DTI in 2006 as a Project Management
Specialist. From January 24, 2011, to February 2, 2011, he took leave from DTI under the
FMLA. Just over a month after he returned, DTI placed him on a Performance
Improvement Plan (“PIP”). Over five months later, on August 18, 2011, DTI terminated
his employment, citing his inability to meet the expectations outlined in the PIP.
On March 1, 2013, Tirpak filed this lawsuit. He alleged that the DTI employeedefendants violated his procedural due process rights in terminating him (Count I). On
appeal, however, he has conceded that the District Court properly rejected this claim. He
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This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

also alleged that DTI itself discriminated against him because of his disability and denied
him reasonable accommodations in violation of the ADA (Counts 2 and 3), and that it
retaliated against him for taking FMLA leave (Count 4).
The defendants moved for summary judgment. DTI argued that Tirpak’s ADA and
FMLA claims against it were barred because it was a state agency and was thus immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. In response, citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), Tirpak argued that these claims were permitted under the Eleventh
Amendment because they sought injunctive relief and were against not DTI but rather the
DTI employee-defendants. See Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“[A] person seeking purely prospective relief against state officials for ongoing
violations of federal law may sue under the ‘legal fiction’ of Ex parte Young . . . .”).
In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the District Court first concluded
that the Eleventh Amendment barred Tirpak’s ADA and FMLA claims insofar as those
claims were against DTI itself. DTI enjoys sovereign immunity unless it has consented to
the suit or Congress has abrogated its immunity for the claim at issue. Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). As the District Court determined,
neither exception applied to these claims. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate states’
sovereign immunity for claims asserted under Title I of the ADA); Coleman v. Court of
Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1338 (2012) (holding that Congress lacked authority to
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity for claims relating to FMLA’s self-care provision).
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The District Court then rejected Tirpak’s Ex parte Young argument, concluding
that he had failed in several ways to properly plead his ADA and FMLA claims against
the DTI employee-defendants. It pointed out that Tirpak pleaded these claims only
“against Defendant Department of Technology and Information” and that, by contrast, he
pleaded his procedural due process claim against the DTI employee-defendants. (App. 7.)
It also highlighted how, in pleading the ADA and FMLA claims, Tirpak named DTI as
the singular “Defendant.” (Id.) It also concluded that, even if Tirpak had pleaded these
claims against the DTI employee-defendants and not just DTI itself, he still failed to
plead plausible ADA and FMLA claims against them because he specified in his
complaint that he was suing them each “individually” rather than in their official
capacity. See Koslow, 302 F.3d at 178 (allowing ADA claim against a state official, “but
only in his representative—not his individual—capacity”); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,
703 F.3d 956, 964 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that Eleventh Amendment does not bar FMLA
claim for prospective relief against “state officials in their official capacity”). The District
Court then declined to allow Tirpak to amend his complaint to cure these defects, noting
that he had never requested leave to amend his complaint. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v.
Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2007) (establishing that
district courts must sua sponte grant plaintiffs leave to amend only in civil rights cases).
We find the District Court’s analysis to be correct in all respects and will therefore
affirm its grant of summary judgment to DTI and the DTI employee-defendants.
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